Political Economy of the Polarization of LEs-SMEs Industrial Structure in Korea by Lim, Haeran
223
Political Economy of the Polarization of LEs-SMEs 
Industrial Structure in Korea*
Lim, Haeran**
The purpose of this study is to analyze the polarization of the LEs (Large Enterprises)-SMEs 
(Small-Medium Enterprises) industrial structure in Korea within the context of political 
economy. The SMEs began increasing in terms of numbers, production, and value added 
beginning in the 1980s. This resulted from the rise in self-employment following increased 
unemployment, rapid liberalization and structural adjustment since democratization. The 
LEs and SMEs had interacted with each other through the subcontracting relationship. 
By applying the new institutional approach to this study, three factors can be suggested as 
institutional context for either the limited success or failure of SMEs policies: SMEs’ exclusion 
from a winning political coalition, the absence of a political role of interest groups for SMEs, 
and the exploitative subcontracting relations between the LEs and the SMEs. The state did 
not put forth real efforts to prohibit the exploitative subcontracting system and to pursue a 
productive discourse.
Keywords: SMEs, LEs, Polarization, Subcontracting Relations, New institutional 
Approach, Korea
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent U.S. financial crisis of 2008 has resulted in a negative ripple 
effect that has shaped the global economy. Yet the conventional wisdom that 
everyone has a difficult time during economic recessions does not apply in the 
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case of Korea. The profit margin of SMEs and a few LEs are worsening day by 
day. However, profitability of a majority of LEs shows no sign of having been 
affected, but instead are showing improvement. Consequently, polarization 
between LEs and SMEs is worsening again as it had been immediately after 
the 1997 financial crisis. 
Economic polarization describes the widening gap between different 
sectors of the economy caused by the weakening of their interrelationships. 
The polarization appears in many forms, such as between exports and 
domestic demand, between industries and industries, between corporations 
and corporations, and between of employment and wages. The causes 
for intensifying polarization include globalization, the rise of China, 
acceleration of technological advances, and the global financial crisis that in 
turn negatively effected Korea’s domestic structure. This research will focus 
primarily on the problem of polarization between the LEs and SMEs, and 
to shed light on the policy implications from the perspective of political 
economy.
The academic fields of business administration and economics have been 
conducting and accumulating many studies on LEs and SMEs. Most have 
focused on measuring fair transactions and policies that support SMEs in 
order to enhance the coexisting relationship between LEs and SMEs; that 
includes technological support, financial support, tax support and start-
up assistance. It is important to discuss the relationship between LEs and 
SMEs from the perspective of efficiency, but it is also necessary to analyze 
the relationship from the perspective of politics or the political economy 
(Kim et al. 2008). For quite a while the government has placed much effort 
into creating a harmonious relationship between the LEs and SMEs, one of 
those being through its SME Promotion Policy. Despite these efforts, the 
polarization phenomenon persists.  The causes range from changes in the 
external economic environment to internal economic situations. Among 
these this study will focus on the political economy, and more specifically, 
it will explain the truth and falsity of governmental policies initiated to 
promote SMEs, the role of SME interest groups, as well as the subcontracting 
relationships between LEs and SMEs.
The structure of this study is as follows: section 2 will examine the current 
situation of the polarization phenomenon of the LEs and SMEs. Section 3 
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will apply the new institutional approach to examine why SME promotion 
policies brought only limited results. In section 4, to explain why these 
policies resulted in limited outcomes, it will discuss the government policies, 
the interest groups of SMEs and the subcontracting relationships between 
LEs and SMEs. Section 5 concludes this research with a summary and policy 
implications.
II. POLARIZATION OF LES AND SMES 
Economic polarization is when economic outcomes are divided to extreme 
ends in the process of reacting to internal and external change caused by 
the heterogeneous properties of economic actors (Ju, H. 2007: 16). Thus 
economic actors face disparity in their economic outcomes because of 
a gap in their technical level and scale, adaptation capabilities, and the 
education level of their employees. Polarization refers to the significant gap 
between the two extremes, as well as that this disparity has a propensity to 
continuously expand. The term is used especially when the cause of this gap 
is structural. 
Beginning in 1980, Korean SMEs began to grow and their number 
began increasing. According to Figure 1, before the 1980s, the scale of 
businesses expanded rapidly because of economies of scale for determining 
competitiveness in the labor-intensive export industry. As a result the priority 
and importance of SMEs decreased.1 In the 1970s with the promotion of the 
heavy chemical industry, support for LEs was further strengthened and the 
merger and acquisitions of SMEs further caused their diminished importance. 
Nevertheless, it was necessary to create a subcontracting relationship between 
the LEs that produced the final product and the SMEs that made the parts 
and components. This provided an opportunity to reinforce awareness that 
there must be policy support for SME. In fact, the reinforcement of SME 
growth owes resulted from the expansion of subcontracting relationships and 
1 The proportion of SMEs in manufacturing employment and added value between 
1963-73 decreased from 66.4% to 52.8% and 39.4% to 272.2% respectively (Baek, N. 
1996).
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the change of governmental policy for promoting SMEs.2 
As it can be seen in Figure 1, the proportion of SMEs in the mining and 
manufacturing industry is 99.4% in terms of firms and 75.9% in terms of 
employees. However when the commerce sector is added, the proportions 
rise to 99.9% and 87.5% respectively. The constant and steady increase in 
the number of self-employed small business owners is another reason for 
the quantitative increase of SMEs after democratization (Kim, S. 2008). 
Some of the reasons lie in the a large number of workers deciding on self-
employment in restaurants, wholesale and retailing in the midst of the high 
unemployment rates that followed democratization and market liberalization. 
Figure 2 compares the proportion of importance that SMEs form in several 
countries. The quantitative proportion of Korean SMEs does not fall behind 
when compared to that of other countries.
2 Using the added value standard, the proportion of SMEs in manufacturing was only 
31.7% in 1975 but it rose to 37.6% in 1985 and reached 49.2% in 1994 (Baek, N. 1996).
Source: Kbiz, “SME Federation Status Index”
              http://info.kbiz.or.kr/volcanoi/global/docs/s_contain.html







1963 1967 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2006
(%)
(year)
number of entity number of employment
amount of production amount of value added
 Political Economy of the Polarization of LEs-SMEs Industrial Structure in Korea 227
Korean SMEs expanded quantitatively after the 1980s. Yet polarization 
between the LEs and SMEs has been progressing as well. This phenomenon 
is explained by the profit and productivity gap between the two. According to 
Figure 3, the business profit rate of LEs has been relatively high compared to 
that of SMEs from 1991 until 2007. For 16 years the average profit rate of LEs 
has been 7.8% and 4.9% for the SMEs, with a difference of 2.9%. During 2002-
2005 when polarization worsened, the profit rates of LEs and SMEs moved 
in opposite directions. In 2005 the disparity decreased but again increased 
in 2007. In 2004, the gap for the profit margin ratio reached up to 5.3%. The 
fact that the profitability of LEs increased while that of SMEs declined, and 
that both have intimate ties through subcontracting relations can cause much 
concern. Labor productivity (value added per capita) of SMEs in 1991 was 
48.6% of the total productivity of LEs, 31.4% in 2004 and 30.9% in 2007, 
showing a decrease in the gap (Kbiz, each year).
When compared with other countries such as the United States or Japan, it 
can be seen that the polarization of Korean LEs and SMEs is more severe. In 
Source: Kbiz, “Statistics on Overseas SMEs”, reorganization of 2008.
Figure 2. Comparison of SMEs in Major Countries: Share of SMEs in manufacturing sec-
tor.
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Source: Bank of Korea, Corporation Business Analysis <http://ecos.bok.or.kr/>
Figure 3. Comparison of Ratio of Operating Profit to Net Sales of LEs and SMEs.
Source: Kbiz, SME Statistics DB <http://stat.kbiz.or.kr/stat_new/stat_00.asp>
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the case of Japanese SMEs in the manufacturing sector, the labor productivity 
of SMEs has been 50% of that of the LEs, and this rate had been stable for 
quite a long period (1982-2003). The SMEs of the US also accounted for 
58.2% in 1997 and 59.2% in 2002, showing even some improvement. This 
sharply contrasts with the Korean case where it decreased to 33.6% in 2003 
from 53.8% in 1988. (Ju, H. 2007: 106-112). 
The proportional significance of LEs in number of businesses, volume 
of output and added value show tendencies of reduction, the significance of 
SMEs has been increasing. However when the index indicating productivity 
and profitability is examined, we see that polarization has intensified in 
qualitative terms. The gap between the two is to some extent inevitable. 
However, it becomes a concern if the profitability of LEs increases while 
that of SMEs decreases while the two are in a coordinated subcontracting 
relationship. Problems such as the weakness of SMEs in the Korean economy, 
their low equipment investment levels, low efficiency in research and 
development investment, in addition to the LE centered industrial structure 
of South Korea, have all been continuously subject to concern.
As it can be seen in Figure 3 and Figure 4, polarization accelerated after 
democratization in the 1990s. As the labor union became more active after 
democratization, employment by corporations decreased while expanding 
their automated production facilities and subcontracting relationships. This 
resulted in expanding polarization between companies.3
3 Interview. Joo Hoon Kim, Senior Researcher at KDI, 2009. 7. 1. This is because as 
labor unions became more active after democratization, corporations decreased the 
number of employees hired and increased the number of subcontracting relationships; 
Table 1. Change in Gap between LEs and SMEs in their Key Indicators
1993 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2007




















productivity Manufacturing 45.7 43.2 39.8 38.7 35.4 32.2 31.3 33.2 30.9
Note: Relative wage and productivity of SMEs (LEs = 100).
Source: Kbiz, Status of SMEs in 2008, Kim, S. et al. 2008
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Some say the reason for greater polarization between LEs and SMEs was 
the relatively late restructuring of SMEs compared to the prompt response by 
LEs. The difficulty of M&A by weak SMEs resulted from the rigid financial 
system, which was one cause that made SME restructuring difficult.4 Also 
the long-term high exchange rate policy implemented by the government in 
order to increase exports aggravated problems for domestic-demand oriented 
SMEs (Hankyoreh, 2005/1/3). In contrast, the economic power of LEs after 
1997 increased significantly. The reason for this increased influence after 
the financial crisis was while sorting out the weak SMEs, the LE-centered 
economic structure was consolidated in each of the industries. Also, because 
of competition with China, the profitability of SMEs weakened, which also 
led to the intensification of this economic structure (Kim, D. 2007: 486). The 
rise of China’s economy intensified competition between South Korea and 
China, resulting in a weakened export competitiveness, industrial hollowing-
out, and limiting job creation in domestic SMEs. Because this study will focus 
on the political economic perspective, this paper will present the causes of 
polarization and the relevant countermeasures. It points out the truth and 
falsities of policies that the government has implemented by examining 
the dynamics of public and private interest groups related to SMEs, and 
examining the reality of subcontracting relations between LEs and SMEs.
III.  THEORETICAL DISCUSSION: FAILURE OF THE 
SME POLICY AND THE APPLICATION OF NEW 
INSTITUTIONALISM
While studies may not agree about all the cause of polarization, it is likely 
that many will agree that one of the many causes is governmental policy. 
this led to an increase in added value per capita for LEs. 
4 In the M&A of weak SMEs, the conservative tendencies of financial institutions 
results in avoiding loans to SMEs. When loans are made for weak SMEs, they become 
primarily non-performing loans (NPL) because they are either non-recoverable or 
they are not interest-bearing. In this sense credit guarantee and loan opportunities for 
SMEs remain under strict restrictions by financial institutions. Chong Ook Rhee 2007, 
p. 197. Interview by Joo Hoon Kim, Senior Researcher at KDI, 2009. 7. 1.
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The Korean government has continuously led LE-friendly policies, which 
resulted in their development and expansion. In comparison, the weakness of 
Korean SMEs comes not from the fact that there were no governmental SME 
promotion policies, but that many of them were mere policies of “relief out 
of courtesy” that did not reap much tangible result. This research will shed 
light on the SME development policies by applying the perspective of new 
institutionalism.
Old institutionalism, the origin of new institutionalism, emphasizes 
official and static laws and institutions. However, behavioralism in the 1950s- 
1960s criticized the old institutional perspective about its focus on mere 
perfunctory law and administration, and in response began emphasizing the 
informal distribution of power and political behavior. However the revolution 
of behavioralism, while focusing on the attitude and behavior of individuals 
and groups, cannot fully explain why different countries with similar groups 
and individuals with similar resources demonstrate different behaviors. It 
was new institutionalism that proposed a significant critique regarding this 
point. Different countries reacted differently to crises after the financial crises 
of the 1970s. New institutionalism focuses on the middle-range institutional 
attributes of states, the institutional network connecting corporate networks, 
the state bureaucracy, political parties and economic groups. Through 
these factors, it examines how the institutional environment offers specific 
incentives and constraints to the political actors (Katzenstein 1978; Gourevitch 
1986). Katzenstein explains the different responses that different actors 
display in similar crises, focusing on the political network connecting the 
state and society, or the “relational character of institutions.” Similar groups or 
individuals display different reactions because of their differing institutional 
contexts. However this perspective also has limitations in that it emphasizes 
institutions only when the reform process and its outcomes vary over time 
within a single country.
New institutionalism has developed into two branches—rational-
choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism. Rational-choice 
institutionalism accepts the role of institutions but assumes that preference 
is exogenously given and that it is stable and coherent. However, when 
there is institutional change the rules of the games change and that changes 
the strategic choices humans make. Historical institutionalism does not 
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regard human preference as exogenously given but sees them as internally 
constructed and redetermined (Hall and Taylor 1996; March and Olsen 1984; 
Katznelson and Weingast 2005). 
Rational-choice institutionalism sees the institution as a ‘structure’ that 
influences the strategic choices human make, and historical institutionalism 
views that the institution itself shapes human preference. Both perspectives 
have a larger emphasis on ‘structure’ than the ‘actor’ and in the process of 
policy decision emphasizes ‘institution’ more than the ‘ideas.’ As pointed 
out before, when structure and institution are emphasized, it is difficult to 
discover why some policies succeed and others fail under similar institutions. 
In fact, individual preferences can be constructed by the structural and 
institutional influences, but at the same time powerful political leaders who 
accept new ideas can form new preferences. Also, policy choice and results 
may vary according to the political coalitions and conflicts (Peter et al. 2005; 
Schmidt 2009).
New institutionalism has overlooked the role of the state. Rational-choice 
institutionalism recognizes the state as a structure influencing the actors. The 
historical institutional perspective recognizes the state as an institution that 
leads to path dependency. The perspective of Varieties of Capitalism (VOC) 
regards the state as a regulator in the globalized environment and focuses 
on the firm as the basic unit of analysis (Hall and Soskice 2001). Recently 
the new perspective of discursive institutionalism began to draw scholarly 
attention, as a result of internal development of new institutionalism. 
Recently the perspective of discursive institutionalism emphasizes the role of 
‘ideas’ rather than ‘institutions’ and the role of ‘agency’ rather than ‘structure’. 
Discursive institutionalism emphasizes dynamic politics to understand 
the role of the state. Politics is understood as either power conflicts or 
coalitions among various interest groups, or as the process of the interactive 
discourses. Governmental discourse can be divided into coordinative 
discourse and communicative discourse. The coordinative discourse refers 
to mutual exchange and persuasion among politicians, policy experts, and 
entrepreneurs, whereas the communicative discourse refers to politicians 
or a government spokesperson attempting to persuade the public (Schmidt 
2009, 529-534). In many cases the failure of reform policies can be attributed 
to the opposition of interest groups, but even more important is a lack of 
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effort for politicians to persuade the public. Discursive institutionalism places 
significance on the political alliance between actors, interaction as well as the 
process of persuasion between the government and the major actors. Political 
coalition is crucial in understanding state policy, and its consequences.
To explain why the SME policies failed, this study adopts the theory 
of new institutionalism.5 Its utility is that in addition to emphasizing the 
state’s role, it includes the relationship between the state and other middle 
range institutions in its analysis. As the new institutional framework is 
applied in this study, the political coalitions among the state, the LEs, and 
the SMEs, the relationship between the state and SMEs, the subcontracting 
relations between the Les and the SMEs, and its governmental rules on 
this subcontracting relations, all become significant analytical tools. This 
comprehensive analysis of institutional characteristics will reveal the reasons 
behind limited results of the SME Promotion Policies. To begin with, many 
policies were ineffective; most were merely ‘relief out of courtesy,’ and the 
government did not fully implement the laws on subcontracting due to their 
continuous LE-friendly policies. This study will also analyze the role of SME 
interest groups and the characteristics of LE-SME subcontracting relations.
IV.  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LES-SMES 
POLARIZATION
1. Government Policy: Limited outcomes
As observed earlier, the productivity and profitability of LEs and SMEs have 
become polarized since the 1990s, and became heightened during 2002-
2005 after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Economic variables such as the 
internal and external changes of the economic environment are significant 
to understand polarization, but it is also necessary to examine the political 
5 New-institutionalism that this research intends to utilize is the most recently 
developed form of ‘discursive institutionalism’. Discursive institutionalism 
reemphasizes the role of the state, and it carries out its analysis in the dimensions of 
state policy, polity, and politics. This research emphasizes the political dimension. 
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variables such as the governmental policies that implemented the SME 
policies, the role of interest groups that advocated the interests of SMEs, and 
the subcontracting relationship between the LEs and SMEs which affected the 
SMEs significantly in their growth.
The effectiveness of governmental policies implemented to promote 
SMEs was in fact quite low. As mentioned earlier, these policies were “out 
of courtesy.” Despite this fact, the basic foundation of SME support policies 
underwent change after democratization. The South Korean economy had to 
adapt itself to the environment of sophistication and unlimited competition 
of the economic structure after democratization. In this case, economic 
democratization took the form of deregulation and market liberalization 
(Lim 2008). In addition, SMEs also encountered fundamental change from 
receiving protection, to being thrown out into competition. The change of the 
large framework in SME policy can be summarized as from protection and 
support in the 1980s, to liberalization and competition in the 1990s, from 
direct to indirect support. The most representative policies in the 1990s are 
as follows: the abolition of designation of the kyeyŏlhwa plan, “core business 
industry designation policy,” and “collective private contract policies”. 
The SME policies prior to democratization emphasized protecting and 
supporting SMEs while also regarding them as relatively weak compared 
to LEs. In this way, SMEs were regarded not as a source of growth but as a 
countermeasure to concentrated economic power and to promote social 
justice (Cho, M. and Kim, S. 2008). Because of HCIs (heavy chemical 
industries: HCIs) policy of the government, the phenomenon of capital 
concentration accelerated during the 1970s. M&As of SMEs by LEs resulted 
in the reduction in the number of SMEs, and the SME promotion policies 
did not reap many effective results. Rather, the governmental SME policies 
of the 1970s focused on passive protection policies, acceleration of vertical 
integration between LEs and SMEs, and consolidation of subcontracting 
relationships.
The Chun Doo Hwan administration during the 1980s proposed a more 
active SME support policy. At that time the necessity of supporting SMEs was 
proposed because the limitations of LE-centered heavy chemical industries 
had surfaced with the change of the international political economy. The 
HCIs industrialization strategies required constant component and material 
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related with imports and as a result became the main cause of the inactivity 
of intermediary goods and thus the trade deficit with Japan. In this situation, 
it was thought that SME support policies were urgently needed (Kim, S. et al. 
2008: 25). However, economic policies at that time favored economic growth, 
and given the persistence of exclusive political coalitions comprised of the 
government, LEs, and technocrats, SME support policies resulted in actions 
of “relief out of courtesy.” The difficulty of the relationship between LEs and 
SMEs lies primarily in the exploitative subcontracting relationships.
The Roh Tae Woo administration, after the 1987 political democratization, 
emphasized equality, competition, and welfare—the democratic principles 
of the economy. The general consensus is that the Roh administration’s 
SME policies were relatively more regressive than those of the Chun 
administration. Market non-intervention policies were predominant for the 
facilitation of free competition. SMEs policies was shifted the emphasis from 
‘protection’ to ‘competition’. Revising and legislating SMEs laws were not 
actively sought (Kim, S. et al. 2008: 30).
We next examine in detail the government’s SME support policy 
since democratization in the 1990s. The Kim Young Sam administration 
initiated policies that reflected trends during that time of globalization 
and liberalization. First, while active protection and support policies were 
characteristics of the 1980s, during the 1990’s the Kim administration 
emphasized a political ideology of “autonomy and competition.” Until then 
the government had used direct support policies that focused on specific 
categories of business or specific individual firms, however, they switched to 
providing indirect support policies based on a neutral incentive system. This 
transition began in the 1980s and became more central after the establishment 
of the WTO and South Korea’s membership in the OECD in 1995. Secondly, 
they revised SME laws and merged the SME Business Regulation Act and 
the Gye-yol hwa Promotion Act into the SME Business Protection and 
Cooperation Enhancement between Enterprises Act to strengthen global 
competitiveness and relax regulations. The Special Act on the Promotion of 
Venture Enterprises (1997. 8) was also enacted at that time. Third, the Small 
and Medium Business Administration was established under the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry in February 1996 to strengthen the practical support of 
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SMEs, and to promote systemic governmental policies.6 
Under the Kim Dae-jung administration, SME policy focused on 
the development of knowledge-intensive SMEs under the rubric of a 
democratic market economy. After the financial crisis, the development of 
Small and Medium venture companies became the center of the nation’s 
industrial policy with the legislation of the Special Measure in relation to 
Venture Company Support (1997). The Kim administration proclaimed 
that for the next 5 years, the development of 20,000 venture companies 
would be promoted to transform the industrial structure into one that was 
technology and knowledge-intensive, and ultimately to produce more jobs. 
Venture companies were promoted as the new principle agent for growth 
to overcome the financial crisis and recover economic vitality. While the 
former policy centered on input, protection and development, direct support, 
and producer-orientation, new policies were focused on reform promotion, 
competition and cooperation, creation of an infrastructural ecosystem, and 
consumer-orientation (Small and Medium Business Administration 2007). 
Also, the Presidential Commission on Small and Medium Enterprise was 
established as presidential body for supporting SME development in 1998. 
Its purpose was to review, revise, and assess the SME development policies 
of related departments, and analyze SME’s business trends necessary for the 
Committee to perform its tasks. Their general task was to take on the role 
as a mediator between the different policies of the different department’s 
involved, encouraging cooperation and coordination (Oh, C. 2003: 206). 
The government wanted cooperation among the Presidential Commission 
on Small and Medium Enterprise, the Small and Medium Business 
Administration, the Korea Federation of Small and Medium Businesses, 
the Small & Medium Business Corporation, and other SME supporting 
institutions to compensate for inadequacies in SME policies.7 SMEs’ weakness 
6 The Small and Medium Business Administration Bureau is a central agency where 
SME related work is carried out. It was founded in February 1996 to promote a more 
systematic and effective construction of corporate support policies, discarding the 
Industrial Advancement Administration and expanding the SME division within the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry. Its regional organization is comprised of 11 Regional 
Small and Medium Business administration Bureaus (Kim, S. et al. 2008).
7 The Small & Medium Business Corporation is an institution of communication 
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in Korea is more attributed to the ineffectiveness than the lack of SME 
policies (Baek, N. 1996; Park, D. et al. 2006).
Despite the Kim administration’s state ideology prioritizing SME 
policies, the Collective Private Contract Policies and Core Business Industry 
Designation Policies for developing and protecting SMEs were being 
threatened by those favoring liberalization and deregulation. Objections 
increased in response to possible trade conflicts resulted from market 
liberalization after joining the WTO in 1995, claims of reverse discrimination 
of national LEs, and declining competitiveness of SMEs . Core Business 
Industry Designation Policies that restricted market entry by LEs in business 
areas deemed suitable for SMEs were gradually abolished because they are 
against the market economy. By 2007, all 256 designations were completely 
abolished (Table 2). On principle, the Regulatory Reform Committee decided 
to remove 43 of the 83 remaining designations in 2000, and 45 more in the 
next 5 years (Kim, S. et al. 2008). The Fair Trade Commission insisted on 
prompt abolishment of the Collective Private Contract Policies because they 
also limited competition.
After the SME Core Business Industry Designation Policies were abolished 
in 2007, it was confirmed that 3 out of 4 SMEs in related industries showed 
reduction in their sales. This was mainly caused by extensive competition 
between businesses due to LE market entry (68%), recession in the domestic 
channels, that efficiently conducts work for the promotion and development of SMEs. 
The corporation manages and operates financial loans for prospective SMEs that face 
difficulties in obtaining loans from banks using their own policies and criteria. It was 
established to foster public economic development by efficiently promoting businesses 
for SME development under the Small and Business Corporation Law in December 
1978 (Park, D. et al., 2005: 368; Oh, C. 2003: 208).
Table 2. Progress of SME Core Business Industry Designation






























Source: Kbiz, 2008 “Current Status of SMEs.”
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market (63%), increased cost of raw materials (50.5%) and increase in 
imports of foreign products (10.3%). 89.9% responded ‘no’ to the question 
of whether SME competitiveness increased as a result of market entry of LEs 
(Hankyoreh 2008/10/17). 
Collective Private Contract Policies, introduced in 1965 as a policy for 
SMEs, allowed the government to close contracts under its own discretion 
with the Korea Federation of Small and Medium Businesses without making a 
competitive bid when purchasing a specific product. However this policy was 
criticized because only a few SMEs with vested interests benefitted. In 2003 
only 14.2% of the total SMEs that produced products subject to the Collective 
Private Contract Policies were involved in collective contracts as members 
of the Federation. The top 20% provided 77% of the total supply.  This policy 
removed the members’ incentive of investment to improve technology and 
product quality and weakened SMEs’ competitiveness. It was also abolished 
in 2007 after two year grace period. 
The Roh Moo Hyun administration’s SME policy can be summarized as 
the development of innovational SMEs known as Inno-Biz, which promised 
to develop 30,000 SMEs through a tailored system. The policy focused 
on developing innovative SMEs, development of the part and component 
industries, promotion of ‘Innovation Clusters’ and etc. The number of 
innovational SMEs increased to 20,000 in 2007, new investments of venture 
capital increased to 6.3 billion won, and the number of SME affiliated research 
labs reached 12,300. The Small and Medium Business Administration 
supported Inno-Biz enterprises with technical skills, venture companies, and 
Main-Biz with high value-added. <Table 3> shows that there is a difference 
of efficiency between overall SMEs and Inno-Biz, in the number of jobs 
created, total sales, and R&D. To support these innovative SMEs, the Korea 
Technology Finance Corporation (KIBO) decided to increase the number of 
guarantees based on only ‘technology’ from 15.2% in 2005 to 60% in 2009. 
It also increased the frequency of meetings to promote cooperation between 
LEs and SMEs. However as it can be seen in <Table 4>, although the Kim and 
Roh administration strongly promoted policies to foster venture companies 
and Inno-biz, their implementation process has problems of overlapping and 
confusion.
When we analyze the overall change in growth contribution of LEs and 
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SMEs over several administrations, as in <Table 5>, we see that SMEs showed 
the best performance under the Kim administration and the worst under 
the Park Chung-hee administration.8 During the Third Republic period, 
8 The results compare and analyze the development of each administration’s SME 
support policy, and the growth and contribution rate of LEs and SMEs. The research 
Table 3. Comparison of SMEs Efficiency
Venture firms Inno-biz Average SME







(100 million won, 2004)
79.0 99.0 27.5
Average R&D investment
(100 million won, 2004)
4.3 4.6 1.3
Note:  *Average employment increase during the period (Venture firms 7 years, Inno-biz 9 
years, average firms 10 years).
Source: SME Survey (2005), Inno-biz and Venture firm Survey (2005).
Table 4. Progress of Inno-Biz
Year
Progress Plan
’98-’00 ’01 ’02 ’03 ’04 ’05 ’06 07. 12 ’07 ’08
Venture 
firms
15,774 11,392 8,778 7,702 7,967 9,732 12,218 14,015 15,500 20,000
Inno-biz - 1,090 1,856 2,375 2,762 3,454 7,183 11,526 10,400 14,200
Main-biz - - - - - - 2,619 6,510 2,500 3,00
Total 15,774 12,482 10,634 10,077 10,729 13,186 22,020 32,051 28,400 37,200
Overlapping 
firms




15,774 11,783 9,500 8,558 8,839 10,731 17,512 24,719 23,000 30,000
Source: Current Status of SMEs, 2008.
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the capacity of SMEs fell significantly, comprising less than half of the LEs 
except in the number of entity. During the Kim Dae Jung administration, the 
national economic contribution level of SMEs was the highest. Despite the 
financial crisis, SMEs significantly overtook LEs in the number of entities 
(100.8%), employment (841.7%), shipment (60.4%), and added value (67.7%), 
thanks to SME support policies. During this period the LEs experienced a 
0.8% decrease in their establishments, a 941.7% decrease in employment, 
and saw their production, shipment, and added value contribute no more 
than 39.2%, 39.6% and 32.3% respectively which all reflected weakness. 
With the rise in the Chinese market and the abolition of SME core business 
was based on the manufacturing sector using chronologically organized statistical 
data. Korea Federation of Small and Medium Businesses conducted the research in 
the coming of the 60th year of the establishment of the Korean government. 
































SME 89.7 95.9 99.0 101.3 101.2 100.8 100.0
LE 10.3 4.1 1.0 -1.3 -1.2 -0.8 0.0
Employ-
ment
SME 28.0 48.9 72.9 62.7 24.7 841.7 62.6
LE 72.0 51.1 27.1 -162.7 -124.7 -941.7 37.4
Production
SME 20.3 32.6 40.6 53.8 46.9 60.8 46.2
LE 79.7 67.4 59.4 46.2 53.1 39.2 53.8
Shipment
SME 24.3 32.5 40.7 53.4 47.0 60.4 40.5
LE 75.7 67.5 59.3 46.6 53.0 39.6 59.5
Value 
added
SME 25.5 35.8 41.2 53.5 45.2 67.7 49.5
LE 74.5 64.2 58.8 46.5 54.8 32.3 50.8
Note: Growth contribution (%) = (LE or SME growth/Total manufacturing growth) x100.
Source: Digital Times.
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designation industrial policies during the Roh Moo Hyun administration, the 
growth of production and shipment of SMEs as well as their added value fell 
behind that of the LEs. As a result, polarization increased. 
In surveying this progress of SME policy development, we can see that 
business polarization intensified beginning with democratization and 
the financial crisis, and that government efforts to alleviate the problem 
were ineffective. Several causes of such ineffectiveness can be pointed out. 
First, as labor unions became increasingly active, corporations expanded 
their automated production facilities, resulting in reduced employment 
and increased outsourcing. As a result, the per capita added value of LEs 
increased, and polarization intensified. After the 1997 financial crisis the 
links between chaebols and banks ceased, resulting in the rising cost of 
financing for LEs. With the relationship between the bank and chaebols 
shifting, corporations began to increase employment instead of investing in 
mechanical equipment. Consequently, since the end of the financial crisis 
through 2006, investment in machinery decreased while there was growth 
in employment. The employment of temporary as well as dispatched worker 
positions within corporations became possible, and the outsourcing rate 
continuously rose.
In addition, the polarization within SMEs also exacerbated polarization 
among firms. The number of small enterprises with less than 20 employees 
gradually increased, the subcontracting chain multiplied fourfold, and the 
number of foreign employees and temporary workers increased to lower 
costs. Thus, the increased number of SMEs in Korea is an increase in the 
number of small enterprises, and thus polarization between SMEs and LEs 
worsened. Another reason behind the increased polarization is a problem 
embedded in the Korean financial system. When the SMEs were divided 
according to their production or sales into categories of 30% of higher growth, 
less than 30% growth, and less than 0% growth, between 1999 and 2006 there 
has not been any significant increase in SMEs that have experienced growth 
of more than 30% or less than 30%. On the other hand, the number of SMEs 
that experienced a negative growth increased, which implies that they were 
not kicked out of market. The fact that these companies were not banned 
despite their negative profits shows that companies subject to restructuring 
did not have any exit points via M&A. In the case of insolvent enterprises, 
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they cannot even become liquidated due to their inaccessibility to secure 
loans. Currently the number of businesses with one or more employees is 3.4 
million. However, those that have credit guarantees are only 300,000, which is 
less than 10%. The number of businesses that did not receive credit guarantee 
from the government is considerable, and that 90% must struggle to survive 
in a system of unlimited competition regardless of government support.9 This 
phenomenon is clear evidence of the limited outcome of the government’s 
financial policy towards SMEs.
In conclusion, political democratization influenced economic demo-
cratization, but that democratization was limited to markets and liberalization. 
Consequently, the direction of SME support policy changed from protection 
and promotion to liberalization and competition. The problem was that the 
vulnerable SMEs were forced to face unlimited competition without structural 
reform to improve competitiveness. The government basically continued their 
pro-LE policies, and the SME support policies reaped only limited results in 
that they were mere lip-services with no binding force.
2. The Role of SMEs Interest Groups
Another reason behind the limited achievements of the numerous government 
policies regarding SMEs support is related to the role of institutions that 
represent the SMEs’ interests. 
Generally, the Japanese industrial structure compared to that of South 
Korea has developed with a good balance between LEs and SMEs. In fact, 
before the war, the Japanese subcontracting system also showed imbalanced 
relationships. However, the Japanese government continued their efforts in 
protecting and supporting SMEs by initiating various governmental policies 
and establishing laws preventing unfair subcontracting practices. Behind 
these efforts were pressures coming from the interest groups of Japanese 
SMEs, coupled with political will in the government to win electoral support 
(Nishigushi 1994; Lim, H. 1998). The Japanese self-employed business 
group’s politics are more institutionalized and pluralistic. The SME groups 
decided on strengthening their external political connections during periods 
9 Interview. Kim, Joo Hoon, KDI Senior Researcher 2009. 7. 1.
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of crises. From the 1950s to 1960s the Federation of SMEs emerged with 
connections to the leftist party, which exercised a fair amount of political 
pressure. By demonstrating that self-employed businesses and SMEs could 
break away from political support, they were able to influence the Liberal 
Democratic Party, and led it to propose the following policy responses: the 
enactment of the Minor Enterprises Act, a comprehensive development 
plan for SMEs, proposals for creating a favorable environment for SMEs 
such as the establishment of exclusive banks for SMEs, signature loans, SME 
Restructuring Act, and the Minor Enterprises Act (Kim, S. et al. 2008: 41). 
The SME loan policy showed effectiveness to the extent that by 1967, the 
amount of bank loans received by the SMEs exceeded that of the LEs. Japan’s 
SME development began from below, initiated by the independent SME 
movements. 
Apart from being pushed aside in the LE-centered structure, SME interest 
groups also have a significantly limited role in Korea. When the influence of 
the Federation of the Korean Industries (FKI) and Korea Federation of Small 
and Medium-sized Businesses (Kbiz), the main interest groups of LEs and 
SMEs respectively, is compared, the rate of 20.6% whereas 10.6% (Hwang, 
J. 1997). It is also problematic to regard Kbiz as the main representative 
for all the SMEs in Korea. Kbiz in 1999 had a total of 735 associations and 
64,780 companies as members, which is, only 4.9% of total SMEs in Korea 
(Jeong, S. 2002: 196). The ratio of registered Kbiz members lowered to 2.3% 
in 2006. But as it altered eligibility of membership in regard to the categories 
of business, the membership rate rose to 19.5%.10 The decisive factor that 
weakens the influence of Kbiz is their low fiscal self-reliance ratio. Since 1963 
Kbiz has been receiving government support, and until 1995 government 
grants accounted for approximately 26.5% of the total ordinary earnings of 
its general account (Jeong, S. 2002). The proportion of the budget supplied 
by membership fees is only 4%. Its dependence on government led to 
circumvent main issues such as conflict with LEs, or financial problems but 
only to respond to minor issues. The overrepresentation of manufacturing 
10 For instance, membership was only limited to cooperatives in manufacturing 
expanded to food suppliers. Interview 2009. 7. 7. Cho, Jin Hyung, Kbiz, Head of the 
Department of Budget.
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industry and the underrepresented commerce industry in Kbiz’ membership 
also weakened representativeness of SMEs.
There is a big difference between LEs and SMEs in membership rate of 
their labor unions. In 2004, the number of workers employed in LEs with 
over 300 employees accounted for 10.1%, whereas the remaining 89.9% were 
employed in SMEs. 72.5% of members of The Federation of Korean Trade 
Union and the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions work in LEs with over 
500 employees, 4.9% in enterprises of 50-99 employees, and 3.3% in small 
businesses with less than 49 employees (Hankyoreh 2005/1/3). The fact that 
labor unions are concentrated in LEs has close relations with the market 
power of LEs.
In contrast with Japan’s balanced industrial structure, the imbalanced 
LE-centralized structure is mainly due to the political ties between the 
government and LEs, and the continuance of LE-oriented industrial policies. 
However, as we can see from the Japanese experience, the political role of 
SME interest groups is also significant. The government policy for supporting 
SMEs in Korea was ineffective because the government was reluctant to 
impose punishments or show political will in cases of non-compliance by LEs. 
SME interest groups are able to exert positive influence on the effectiveness 
of government policy by arranging measures to solidify internal organization 
and strengthen external political ties. Their continuously weak political-
economic position is also caused by the subcontracting relationship between 
the SMEs and LEs, which will be further discussed in the next section.
3. Structure of the LEs-SMEs Subcontracting Relationship
The subcontracting rate of Korea’s SMEs reached 63.1% in 2003, increasing 
from 48.9% in 1994. These subcontractors supply, on average, 82% of their 
total products to LEs. The ratio of SMEs which supply more than 90% of 
their total sales to LEs was 71.4%. The subcontracting rate between LEs 
and SMEs has increased, and the monopoly status of the former over the 
latter has strengthened (Kim, D. 2007: 480). According to Figure 5, whereas 
the number of SMEs that receive orders from other SMEs is decreased, 
their dependence on the LEs increased to 85% in 2007. Main complaints of 
SMEs in transactions with LEs are: the increased price of raw materials are 
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not reflected in the supply price (67.2%), pressure of lowering supply price 
(49.8%), pressure to shorten the delivery date (28.8%), and delaying payment 
(24.6%).11 
According to a study conducted in 2005, 80% of the SMEs identified 
themselves to be in a subordinate position vis-à-vis LEs. According to 
another study by Kbiz on 150 SMEs, only 0.7% supported to the LEs 
expanding into the business field of SMEs while 84.5% opposed. The 
difficulties for SMEs conducting business included the highhandedness of 
LEs in their subcontracting transactions (32.4%), manpower shortage (28.3%), 
lack of demand for their products (13.7%), and government interference 
and regulations (9.4%). The most frequent case of unfair subcontracting 
transactions was unilateral automatic cut of supply price (63.2%), arbitrary 
modification or cancel of orders (15%), and delaying payments (10.3%). 
What’s needed to facilitate fairness are fair practice of subcontracting (64.6%), 
localization (17.4%), financial support (10.2%), and joint marketing (5.4%) 
11 The average of assemblers for each supplier to supply the product increased to 14.5, 
and the Small and Medium Business Administration (SMBA) interprets this as a 
diversification trend of the supply structure. The SMBA has reported the Status of 
Korean SMEs 2007 that surveyed 4100 small and medium manufacturing companies 
(Daily Labor News 2008/11/19).
Source:  The Small and Medium Business Administration, “SME Current Status Survey, 
2008.”
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(Hankyoreh 2005/5/18). 
SMEs’ Financial problems aggravated after the 1997 financial crisis due 
to the delaying payment. Even though the supply price was made through 
negotiations, the majority believed that the buying assembler’s influence 
was determinant in the price decision. No more than 5.2% agreed that the 
suppliers’ position was adequately considered (Lee, Y. 2003: 223).
Businesses that followed each step of the transaction were asked of their 
experiences in receiving demands of reduced product unit price. According 
to the results, at the second and third step of the transactions, more demands 
were received for cutting unit price (33.1% for step 1, 37.2% for step 2, and 
55.3% for step 3). At the second and third steps of the transactions, there was a 
tendency to depend more on simple, manufactured products than complicated 
ones, and a larger possibility of price competition within the same industry. 
Second and third step vendors had better provide differentiated products 
based on better skills, a tool to evade price competition (KOSBI 2009). 
According to the companies that replied to the survey on the demand of 
low cost, most cited the continued LE demands of cutting cost, LE-centered 
economic structure, and wage increases subsequent to LE labor unions as the 
primary causes. 57.8%, and more than half, claimed that the fundamental 
problem had to do with the behavior of LEs. The following are solutions 
suggested, about unit price negotiations. Most of those replied claimed that 










































































Note:  Exceeds 100.0 due to multiple answers; Supply price does not reflect increase in raw 
materials, Request for patented technology information reflected in 2007 investiga-
tion.
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Requirement for Product Unit Price Negotiation Policy would be more 
efficient than Pegged Unit Price. 35.7% claimed that the former will be more 
effective, and furthermore, 33.7% replied that there would be positive results 
when the government thoroughly oversees the process and secures the laws. 
Also, 35.7% were concerned with retaliation from LEs, which decreased the 
Table 7. Experiences of reduction in supply price according to each transaction step






























Source: KOSBI, “The Survey on Transactions between LEs and SMEs, 2009”.
Table 8. Fundamental cause of the pressure of low cost
Frequency Percentage(%)
Continuous demand of low costs by the major LEs
LE-oriented business structure
Exploitation of higher status by consigner company
Technical skills of SMEs
Wage increase for LE labor union, pressures from increased 
  price of raw materials, etc.

















Source: KOSBI, “The Survey on Transactions between LEs and SMEs, 2009”.
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effectiveness of such measures.
According to <Table 9>, 55.5% of the companies claimed that the LE-
centered economic structure and structural imbalance were primary causes 
of polarization, and 33.0% suggested the cause to be the trend towards 
globalization and lack of competitiveness of SMEs—showing that a majority 
attributed polarization to the LE-centered economic structure. The most 
popular suggestion to rectify this problem included reforming the currently 
LE-structured economic structure, improving technical capabilities of SMEs. 
And the second suggestion was strengthening the fairness of subcontracting 
relations. Institutional reform is necessary to prevent unfair corporate 
practices. For instance, in order to prevent any disadvantages for the 
consignees, 38.2% of the investigated group claimed that it was necessary to 
frequently initiate investigations regarding unjust transactions of consigners 
when the consignees are reported. Also, 27.1% answered that precedents of 
unjust cases should be reflected more effectively in the laws to exclude all 
unfair practices, 12.7% claimed that punishment should be intensified to 
increase losses when unjust practices are carried out by the consigners, and 
12.5% suggested that policy consolidation for SME technology and quality 
competitiveness is needed.
A majority of those studied claimed polarization resulted from LEs-
centered industrial structure, and this shows that government policies favor 
LEs. Suggested reforms include punishing unfair transaction practices and 
frequent investigations of LEs. This shows that there has been a constant, 
exclusive political alliance between the government and LEs.
Table 9. Causes of polarization of LEs and SMEs
Causes Frequency Percentage
Polarization is an inevitable trend in globalization period
LE-centered economic structure intensifies polarization
SMEs’ lack of technical skills and competitiveness
LE labor unions have exacerbated polarization















Source: KOSBI, “The Survey on Transactions between LEs and SMEs, 2009”.
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V. CONCLUSION
Korean SMEs have grown quantitatively since the 1980s, yet there has 
also been a structural weakness in a constant LE-SME polarization. The 
quantitative development of Korean SMEs does not lag when compared with 
other countries. After the 1980s, in terms of its number, production and 
added value, the number of LEs decreased while that of SMEs increased. Yet 
the profitability of SMEs decreased in their subcontracting relations with 
the LEs. Korean SMEs may have increased in numbers, but in qualitative 
terms they have reflected structural problems such as small size and low 
profitability.
The causes of LEs-SMEs polarization may be explained not just in 
economic terms, but also in terms of the government’s LE-favored policies, 
the ineffectiveness of SME policies, and the exploitative subcontracting 
relationships between the LEs and SMEs. In fact, the number of SME support 
policies and LE-SME cooperative policies were actually overwhelming. 
Moreover, polarization showed signs of intensifying after democratization 
and the financial crisis. Thus, the focus of the problem should not be 
whether there were shortages of such policies but on why these policies were 
ineffective. Causes included the government’s exclusive political alliance with 
Table 10. Measures for LEs-SMEs “win-win” strategy
Possible Measures Frequency of choice
Percentage 
(%)
Strengthening the fair subcontracting system
Reforming the LE-centered economic structure
Strengthening technical skills and competitiveness of SMEs
Continuing policy implementation of LE-SME mutual 
  existence
Joint collective action among SMEs 

















Source: KOSBI, “The Survey on Transactions between LEs and SMEs, 2009”.
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LEs, the lack of political representation for the interests of SMEs, and the lack 
of win-win strategies between LEs and SMEs. To foster cooperation between 
LEs and SMEs for a ‘”win-win” strategy, the government needs to stress the 
importance of “win-win” strategies and continue their efforts in persuading 
the LEs. At the same time, the government’s willingness was not strong 
enough to impose severe punishments for unfair subcontracting practices 
by LEs. Political democratization also influenced the realm of economics in 
Korea, but the economic democratization was perceived as only the opening 
of markets and liberalization. Following democratization, the SME support 
policies focused on liberalization and competition and moved away from 
previous policies of protection and development. However, without structural 
reform for fair competition, SMEs were subjected to unlimited competition 
which caused excessive polarization of LEs and SMEs.
Japan was able to achieve a relatively balanced industrial structure 
because the interest groups of SMEs were institutionalized to significantly 
influence the government. The government also placed sustained efforts on 
developing SMEs to get firm political support. The most important factor 
was that there were effective policies such as the initiation of the Monopoly 
Regulation and Fair Trade Act to foster fair subcontracts between LEs and 
SMEs, and an expansion of financial support for SMEs. The transformation 
of subcontracting relations between LEs and SMEs from exploitative 
to cooperative was an important factor that contributed to balanced 
development.
According to a study conducted in 2003 identifying the number of 
SMEs in the manufacturing industry that developed into LEs exceeding 300 
employees, of 56,000, only 57 became LEs. The number of companies that 
expanded to 500 employees was only 8. The current situation in Korea is 
that there is a structural barricade between LEs and SMEs, which cannot be 
considered a healthy industrial structure.12 The financial support policies 
for SMEs has shown limitations, by financial institutions maintaining their 
conservative tendencies during takeover and M&A processes of weak SMEs. 
In order to prevent further polarization and to develop a balanced industrial 
structure, it is necessary to implement more effective policies and foster win-
12 Interview. Kim, Joo Hoon, KDI Senior researcher 2009. 7. 1.
 Political Economy of the Polarization of LEs-SMEs Industrial Structure in Korea 251
win strategies between LEs and SMEs. Also, SME interest groups need to 
consolidate internally and strengthen their external political ties in order to 
positively influence the effectiveness of governmental policies.
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